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Executive Summary 
 
Under automatic enrolment, employers are required to automatically enrol 
their employees into a qualifying pension scheme. The minimum total 
contribution rate is 8% of a band of earnings from £5,668 and £41,450 per 
annum, of which a minimum 3% must come from the employer. With over 
80% of Defined Benefit (DB) schemes now closed to new members or future 
accruals the majority of employers are expected to select a Defined 
Contribution (DC) pension as their qualifying scheme. 
 
This report analyses what ranges of retirement incomes from a DC pension 
different individuals might achieve by making only the minimum required 
level of contributions. The report also analyses the contribution rate necessary 
for different individuals to have a “good chance” of achieving an adequate 
retirement income. This report employs outputs from the PPI Individual 
Model adapted to use stochastic modelling techniques, based on a model 
developed by the Department of Mathematics at King’s College London. Each 
individual modelled is run 100,000 times with different economic scenarios. 
This illustrates better the variability around investment returns and economic 
variables year on year. 
 
Adequacy can be defined as to what extent individuals have a retirement 
income that fulfils their basic needs or to what extent retirement income 
allows individuals to replicate the standards of living they had while in 
working life. Replacement rates are a good way to assess whether pensioners 
may be able to replicate their working life living standards. This report uses 
replacement rates similar to those set out by the Pension Commission to assess 
the adequacy of retirement income for different individuals under different 
scenarios. 
 
Retirement income from private and state pensions is uncertain. The target 
replacement income for a median earner is 67% of their pre-retirement 
earnings. In 49% of the cases generated in the modelling a median earner 
could reach their target replacement income with private and state pensions 
income, if starting to save at age 22, retiring at State Pension Age (SPA), 
following a traditional lifestyle investment approach and contributing at 8% of 
band earnings (Chart A). 
 
Saving at the minimum contribution rate of 8% of band earnings may not 
be enough for some individuals. In more than half of the scenarios modelled 
income is below the target replacement income and in 25% of the scenarios 
income from private and state pensions was less than 75% of the target 
replacement income.  
 
Lower earners have a higher probability of achieving their target replacement 
income than median or higher earners. (Chart B). 
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Chart A1 
PPI
PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTERetirement income from private 
and state pensions is uncertain
Probability of retirement incomes from state and private pensions at SPA 
for a median earner that starts saving at age 22, retires at SPA and follows a 
traditional lifestyle investment approach, if contributing at 8% of band 
earnings  
 
 
Chart B2 
PPI
PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE
The probability of achieving the 
target replacement income varies 
by earnings level
Probability of achieving the target replacement income with income from 
private and state pensions for different individuals, if starting to save at 
age 22, retire at SPA follow a traditional lifestyle investment approach and 
contributing at the minimum total 8% of band earnings
 
 
 
1 PPI and King’s College London modelling analysis 
2 PPI and King’s College London modelling analysis 
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Under the baseline scenario of starting to save at age 22, retiring at SPA and 
following a traditional lifestyle investment approach, a lower earner has a 63% 
probability of achieving their target replacement income, compared to 49% for 
a median earner and 40% for a higher earner. Lower earners have a higher 
probability of achieving their target replacement rate because the single-tier 
state pension introduced from 2016 will represent a higher proportion of 
lower earners’ pre-retirement earnings than for median or higher earners. 
 
However, adequacy will be sensitive to the indexation mechanism used for 
the single-tier state pension. Currently, the Basic State Pension (BSP) is 
uprated by the triple lock of the higher of changes in average earnings, 
changes in the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) or 2.5%. Current legislation 
stipulates that the BSP must be uprated at least in line with changes in average 
earnings. Once the single-tier pension is introduced in 2016, it will be up to the 
government of the day to decide whether anything more than average 
earnings is needed. Adequacy is much harder to achieve if the single-tier state 
pension is increased in line with average earnings rather than triple locked 
(Chart C). 
 
Chart C3 
 
 
The triple lock indexation mechanism for the single-tier state pension is more 
generous than just average earnings because in years of low inflation or 
earnings growth, the single-tier pension would increase by at least 2.5%. The 
probability of different individuals achieving the target replacement income if 
 
3 PPI and King’s College London modelling analysis 
PPI
PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE
Adequacy is much harder to achieve 
if the single-tier state pension is not 
triple locked but earnings linked
63%
49%
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Triple locked Earnings linked
Probability of achieving the target replacement income for different individuals 
with income from private and state pensions, if they start saving at age 22, retire at 
SPA, follow a  traditional lifestyle investment approach and contribute at 8% of 
band earnings, under different indexation rules for the single-tier state pension
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contributing at the legal minimum of 8% of band earnings reduces by almost a 
half if the single-tier state pension is indexed by average earnings.  
 
For a lower earner, the probability of achieving their target replacement 
income decreases from around 63%, if the single-tier pension is uprated by the 
triple lock, to around 36% if the single-tier pension is uprated by average 
earnings. For a median earner, the probability of reaching their target 
replacement income decreases from around 49% to 30% and for a higher 
earner the probability decreases from around 40% to around 28%. 
 
The contribution rate needed to achieve an adequate retirement income will 
be sensitive to investment approaches and charges. In automatic enrolment, 
many individuals will stay in default funds, with a pension scheme chosen by 
their employer. This default fund could be based on one of a number different 
investment approaches. Different investment approaches would entail 
different levels of annual management charges (AMC) applied to an 
individual’s fund.  
 
There are different investment approaches but this report considers retirement 
outcomes under three approaches. Under a traditional lifestyle investment 
approach, the funds in which pension contributions are invested are changed 
automatically depending on the length of time until the expected retirement 
date. Members’ funds are invested in equities since early years and switched 
to gilts and cash as the individual approaches retirement. A first alternative 
approach aims to achieve lower volatility in early years at the expense of 
potential returns. A second alternative approach aims to reduce volatility but 
not at the expense of lower returns. This is done by reducing equity volatility 
within a traditional lifestyle approach. 
 
The investment approach and the AMC paid, together with the indexation 
mechanism used for the single-tier state pension, could affect the contribution 
rate needed to achieve an adequate retirement income (Table D).  
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Table D4 
  Single-tier triple 
locked 
Single-tier earnings 
linked 
Probability 
of achieving 
the target 
replacement 
income 
Investment 
approach 
AMC: 
0.5% 
AMC:  
1% 
AMC: 
0.5% 
AMC:  
1% 
Two-thirds  Traditional 
lifestyle 
11% 12% 14% 16% 
First 
alternative 
12% 14% 16% 17% 
Second 
alternative 
10% 12% 14% 15% 
Three-
quarters 
Traditional 
lifestyle 
13% 15% 17% 18% 
First 
alternative 
14% 15% 17% 19% 
Second 
alternative 
12% 14% 15% 17% 
 
The contributions required do vary between the different stylised investment 
strategies modelled. However, the contributions required do not change 
significantly with the alternatives, generally either one percentage point 
higher or lower than under a traditional lifestyle approach. The contributions 
required are more sensitive to both charges and the indexation mechanism for 
the single-tier state pension. 
 
The range of outcomes taking into account changes in all these factors is large. 
For example, the total contribution required to reach a two-thirds chance of 
achieving the target replacement income ranges from 10% in a low charging 
scheme with a triple locked state pension to 17% in a higher charging scheme 
and an earnings linked state pension. 
 
Changes in contribution patterns affect the contribution rate needed for an 
adequate retirement income. Whether people take career breaks, start to save 
later in life or decide to retire some years after their SPA affects the 
contribution rates needed to have a good chance of reaching an adequate 
retirement income. But this also depends on the indexation mechanism used 
to uprate the single-tier state pension. (Chart E) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 PPI and King’s College London modelling analysis 
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Chart E5 
 
 
If the single-tier state pension is uprated by the triple lock, a median earner 
that takes a career break needs a total contribution rate of 14% to have a two-
thirds chance of reaching the target replacement income, compared to 11% 
under the baseline of starting to save at age 22 and retiring at SPA. The 
contribution rate needed increases to 23% if the median earner starts to save at 
age 40. If the single-tier state pension is uprated by changes in average 
earnings a median earner needs a total contribution rate of 18% if taking 
career breaks and 27% if starting to save at age 40.  
 
By contrast, a contribution rate of 9% of band earnings will be necessary to 
have a three-quarters chance of reaching the target replacement income if 
retiring two years after SPA and the single-tier state pension is uprated by the 
triple lock. This increases to 13% if the single-tier state pension is uprated by 
changes in average earnings. 
 
Many individuals will need to contribute more than the legal minimum.  
The Government could consider a number of strategies to increase pension 
saving. The Government could encourage or enable the provision of 
information and advice to individuals, or they could provide better incentives 
for pension saving, so that individuals choose to save more. 
 
However, automatic enrolment was introduced because the system of 
incentives to save and advice has not worked well in the past. There is also 
evidence that the system of incentives to save is poorly understood. 
 
5 PPI and King’s College London modelling analysis 
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The Government could consider a number of inertia mechanisms to increase 
contribution levels such as auto-escalation where a member contribution rate 
increases in line with earnings increases. However, some form of compulsion 
by making saving into a pension mandatory might need to be considered if 
individuals opted-out in large numbers as a result of higher minimum 
contributions. The Government could also promote initiatives that encourage 
people to use other types of wealth to increase their retirement savings and 
promote initiatives to make individuals work longer. 
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Introduction 
 
Once automatic enrolment into workplace pensions is fully implemented in 
2018, it is estimated that there could be between 6 and 9 million new savers in 
workplace pensions. With over 80% of Defined Benefit (DB) schemes closed to 
new members or to future accrual, new savers are likely to be enrolled into 
Defined Contribution (DC) schemes, where contribution levels are one of the 
key factors that determine pension outcomes. Current contribution levels to 
DC schemes are low. In 2012 average employee contributions into occupational 
DC schemes were around 3% of salary and average employer contributions 
were around 7% of salary.6 The minimum total contribution rate under 
automatic enrolment is 8% of a band of earnings from £5,668 and £41,450 per 
annum, of which a minimum 3% must come from the employer. 
 
Against this background, this report analyses how incomes generated from 
these contributions compare to an income that might be considered adequate 
for retirement for individuals with different characteristics. This report also 
analyses how the required levels of contributions to achieve an adequate 
retirement income differ from current contribution levels, and discusses to 
what extent there is an adequacy gap. The analysis explicitly accounts for 
uncertainties in investment returns and inflation, which have an impact on 
retirement income adequacy. 
 
Chapter one discusses the main approaches to measure adequacy such as 
poverty thresholds, minimum income standards and replacement rates. The 
chapter then discusses the main factors affecting retirement income from DC 
schemes such as the contribution rate, the history of contributions and the 
investment strategy followed during the accumulation phase. 
 
Chapter two sets out the methodological approach used throughout this report 
to measure retirement income adequacy. The chapter then analyses the 
distribution of private pension outcomes and the probability of achieving the 
target replacement rate with income from private and state pensions for 
individuals with different characteristics, if contributing at the legal minimum 
of 8% of band earnings. 
 
Chapter three analyses the contribution rates that would be necessary to 
achieve a two-thirds or three-quarters probability of reaching an adequate 
retirement income.  
 
Chapter four compares the contribution rates necessary to achieve adequate 
retirement income levels with current contribution levels. The chapter 
discusses to what extent there is an adequacy gap. 
 
 
6 ONS (2013) Table 8. Weighted average figures rounded to nearest 1%. 
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Chapter 1: How is adequacy of retirement income 
measured? 
 
This chapter discusses the main measures for retirement income adequacy. It 
also discusses the main factors affecting the retirement income generated in 
Defined Contribution pension schemes. 
 
There are two main definitions of adequacy 
There are two ways of defining adequacy in the context of retirement income: 
· adequacy can be defined as to what extent retirement income allows 
individuals to fulfil basic needs;  
· alternatively, adequacy can be defined as to what extent retirement 
income allows individuals to replicate the standards of living they had 
while in working life. 
 
If the first definition is preferred, poverty thresholds and minimum income 
standards are more appropriate to assess adequacy. If the second definition is 
preferred, replacement rates may be more useful to assess adequacy. 
 
Poverty thresholds 
Poverty thresholds are based on establishing a given income under which 
people are considered to be income poor. Poverty measures can be either 
absolute or relative. 
 
Absolute poverty measures establish the proportion of the population that 
lives below a certain poverty line that is the same across all countries and does 
not change. In the UK, the absolute poverty line is set at 60% of the median 
income in 1998/99 held constant in real terms. In developing countries, the 
World Bank approach of considering the proportion of people with incomes 
under a certain threshold such as $1 or $2 a day is an absolute measure of 
poverty that is used.7 
 
Relative poverty measures employ a poverty line that is related to an average 
income level, which itself changes over time. In the UK and other OECD 
countries, the current relative poverty line is set at 60% of median income of 
the whole population.  
 
The main advantage of absolute and relative poverty measures is that they are 
easy to establish and that they allow comparisons among different groups or 
countries. Yet, relative poverty measures are difficult to project into the future 
as specific assumptions on the progression of median incomes and the income 
of specific groups must be made. 
 
Relative poverty measures are not based on the true income needs of people 
but rather on how their income compares to an arbitrarily set poverty line. 
 
7 See World Bank methodology at: data. worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY 
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Furthermore, relative poverty measures are sensitive to fluctuations in the 
economy. When median income falls, more people within a certain group may 
be moved above the relative poverty line, even if their income has not 
increased.8 
 
Relative and absolute poverty measures can be considered before housing 
costs (BHC) or after housing costs (AHC). The rationale for differentiating 
between these two measures is that housing costs may represent a significant 
outlay for some households (for example, for those living in London), so it 
would be unfair to compare their income to those living in cheaper locations. 
However, AHC income measures may understate the improvement in the 
quality of living of those who decide to pay more for better quality housing. 
Also, housing costs may be different for pensioners as many of them could 
have paid off their mortgages and may have downsized. Therefore, UK 
Government relative income poverty measures are reported both before and 
after housing costs. 
 
In 2011/2012, the relative poverty line was £172 per week for singles with no 
children and £256 for couples with no children, before housing costs (BHC). 
After housing costs (AHC) the relative poverty line was £128 per week for 
singles with no children and £220 per week for couples with no children.9  
 
16% of pensioners (1.9 million) were in households with incomes below 60% 
of median income, before housing costs (BHC). 14% of pensioners (1.6 million) 
were in households with incomes below 60% of median income, after housing 
costs (AHC).10 
  
Minimum income standards 
Minimum income standards have been developed in the UK as an alternative 
to poverty thresholds.11 They are based on feedback from a sample of the 
population on the types of goods and services they deem necessary to stay out 
of poverty. The value of this standard “basket” of goods and services is then 
used to assess whether a person’s income is above or below this level. In 2012, 
the minimum income standard for a pensioner couple was £303 per week, 
including rent but excluding council tax and £241 per week, excluding rent 
and council tax.12 
 
Minimum income standards are sensitive to the specific type of goods and 
services selected and the measures do not account for the changing income 
needs of those who are frail, disabled or long-term ill.13 
 
 
 
8 Price, D. (2008) p. 97 to 102. 
9 DWP (2013) Table 2.2db 
10 DWP (2013) Tables 6.1tr and 6.3tr 
11 Bradshaw et al (2008) 
12 JRF (2013) 
13 Fisher, G. (2007) 
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The introduction of the single-tier state pension may have an impact on the 
number of people below poverty thresholds 
The Government has introduced the Pensions Bill 2013-14 for the 
consideration of Parliament which proposes the implementation of a single-
tier state pension from April 2016. The new pension will replace the current 
Basic State Pension (BSP) and the State Second Pension (S2P). Although the 
specific value of the single-tier pension will be set by the Government of the 
day closer to the implementation date, the Government’s White Paper 
illustrates the new single-tier pension set just above the current Guarantee 
Credit level, at £144 per week (in 2012/13 earnings terms).14 
 
The proposed legislation requires 35 years of National Insurance 
Contributions (NICs) to qualify for a full single-tier state pension, compared to 
30 years to qualify for the Basic State Pension under the current system. A 
significant proportion of future pensioners could qualify for a full single-tier 
pension. Therefore, some future pensioners could have incomes from their 
state pension alone above the relative poverty threshold of 60% of median 
income or the minimum income standard (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Comparison of single-tier pension entitlement and adequacy 
thresholds, £ per week15 
 Single pensioner with 
no children 
Couple pensioner 
with no children 
Full single-tier 
pension 
£144 (2012/13) £288 (2012/13) 
Relative poverty 
threshold (BHC) 
£172 (2011/12) £256 (2011/12) 
Relative poverty 
threshold (AHC) 
£128 (2011/12) £220 (2011/12) 
Minimum income 
standard (including 
rent but excluding 
council tax)16 
N/A £303 (2012/13) 
Minimum income 
standard (excluding 
rent, council tax and 
water rates)17 
N/A £215 (2012/13) 
 
 
 
The figures in Table 1 are based on current levels of poverty thresholds, 
minimum income standards and the proposed single-tier pension. The 
different levels of poverty thresholds and minimum income standards may 
change in the future, as well as the level of the future single-tier pension. 
 
 
14 DWP (2013)  
15 Rounded to nearest £. Source: DWP (2013); JRF (2013); DWP (2012) HBAI 
16 Comparable to BHC in HBAI 
17 Comparable to AHC in HBAI. 
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Even if a significant proportion of pensioners could be expected to have 
incomes above the relative poverty threshold or the minimum income 
standards in the future, they may not be able to replicate the standards of 
living they had while in working life. This is because relative poverty 
thresholds and minimum income standards set a minimum income level. 
Therefore some pensioners could have incomes that may represent a 
significant drop from their pre-retirement earnings.  
 
Replacement rates may be more useful to capture whether pensioners have an 
income that allows them to replicate their working life living standards.    
 
Replacement rates 
Replacement rates are defined as the ratio of retirement income to working life 
earnings. There are two main ways of applying this measure:  
· as a ratio to average earnings or  
· as a ratio to earnings before retirement.  
 
While the concept of a replacement rate may seem straightforward as it is a 
simple ratio of retirement income to earnings, its calculation is sensitive to 
what is considered as retirement income and what is considered as earnings. 
For example, if salary reduces in the years close to retirement, then using a 
definition that considers only the earnings in the year immediately before 
retirement may understate the replacement rate. Similarly, whether housing 
equity is included as income in retirement may affect the calculation of 
replacement rates.18 
 
Despite some disagreement as to how best to define the measure of earnings 
and retirement income used to calculate replacement rates19 the use of 
replacement rates is widespread to measure retirement income adequacy 
because it is a concept relatively easy to understand. As such, replacement 
rates have been used to inform the policy debate in the UK and elsewhere.  
 
The work of the Pensions Commission drew extensively on the use of 
replacement rates to measure adequacy.20 The Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) has recently published a paper analysing the adequacy of 
future pension incomes that also uses replacement rates.21 
 
In the US, replacement rates were also used to analyse retirement income 
adequacy in the context of the Commission for Social Security.22 Therefore, as 
long as some agreement can be made on the measure of earnings and income 
used, replacement rates can be useful to measure retirement income adequacy. 
 
 
18 Munnel (2005) 
19 McGill, Dan M., Kyle N. Brown, John J. Haley, and Sylvester J. Schieber. (2004). 
20 Pensions Commission (2004) 
21 DWP (2013) 
22 Cogan, John F. and Olivia S. Mitchell (2003)  
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Replacement rates may be gross or net of taxes. Gross replacement rates 
include the taxes and contributions that pensioners must pay. Net 
replacement rates exclude such taxes and contributions. In the UK, there is no 
accepted benchmark available for net replacement rates. In contrast, the 
Pensions Commission23 analysis provides a well-known benchmark for gross 
analysis. In practice, as long as the differences in the tax regime are taken into 
account in the setting of the benchmark, the differences in the findings from 
using gross or net replacement rates should be minimal. Table 2 sets out the 
Pensions Commission target replacement rates, uprated to 2012 earnings 
terms and the equivalent target replacement income 
 
Table 2: Pensions Commission target replacement rates in 2012 Earnings 
Terms24 
Earnings Target replacement 
rate 
Target replacement 
income 
Less than £12,136 80% Less than £9,709 
£12,136 – £22,354  70% £8,495 – £15,647 
£22,355 - £31,936 67% £14,978 - £21,397 
£31,937 – £51,098 60% £19,162 – £30,659 
Over £51,098 50% Over £25,549 
 
The target represents the replacement rate that different individuals should 
achieve to be able to replicate the standards of living they had while in 
working life. The target replacement rates are always less than 100% because, 
on average, pensioners have fewer income needs than working-age people as, 
for example, they do not need to commute to work on a daily basis. The target 
replacement rate is higher for lower earners as they may need a higher 
proportion of their pre-retirement earnings to be able to replicate their pre-
retirement living standards.  
 
This report and a recent DWP paper25 use replacement rates to assess the 
adequacy of retirement income and they compare replacement rates to the 
targets set by the Pension Commission. Also, both papers calculate 
replacement rates by comparing retirement income to an average of pre-
retirement earnings. By contrast, while this report considers retirement 
income at SPA and five and ten years after SPA to calculate replacement rates, 
the DWP paper considers the retirement income across the whole of 
retirement, adjusted for inflation. The DWP paper also makes an adjustment 
for housing costs in retirement income and income in working life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 Pensions Commission (2004) 
24 PPI calculations based on Pensions Commission (2004) 
25 DWP (2013) 
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Box 1: The replacement rate measure used in this report 
This report uses replacement rates to assess the adequacy of retirement 
income. Replacement rates are calculated as the ratio of retirement income 
in the year of retirement to the average earnings in the 10 years previous to 
retirement, adjusted by average earnings growth. The report also considers 
the retirement income five and ten years after retirement. Replacement 
rates are compared against the target replacement rates set out by the 
Pensions Commission. 
 
The approach of this report is similar to the one adopted by the DWP to 
measure the adequacy of retirement income.26 
 
The DWP paper uses replacement rates to assess retirement income 
adequacy where: 
· retirement income is averaged across the whole of retirement (and 
adjusted for inflation); 
· income in work is based on average earnings for those years in work 
between age 50 and SPA. 
 
Changes in UK private sector pension provision may affect future 
pensioners’ retirement income adequacy 
DC schemes have become prevalent in the UK private sector. In the late 1960s 
there were over 8 million active members in DB schemes in the private sector. 
By 2011, there were only around 1.6 million active members in DB schemes 
and over 6 million active members (around 60% of all private sector active 
members) in DC schemes.27  
 
Automatic enrolment is likely to increase the number of people saving into 
a DC pension 
From 2012, employers are required to automatically enrol their employees into 
a qualifying scheme. The process is staged. Larger employers started to 
automatically enrol their employees in October 2012 and the process will 
finish in February 2018. Employees from age 22 to SPA and with earnings of at 
least £9,440 will be automatically enrolled, but they will have the right to opt-
out. Once automatic enrolment is fully rolled out in 2018, total contributions of 
8% of a band of earnings from £5,668 to £41,450 (2013/14) will be paid into the 
scheme, with a minimum 3% from the employer. Contributions based on band 
earnings will be lower when considered as a percentage of total earnings, 
although this will depend on the level of earnings (Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 DWP (2013) 
27 PPI (2012) Chart 2 
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Table 3: Equivalence between contributions as a percentage of band 
earnings (£5,668 to £41,450) and as a percentage of total earnings 
Contribution 
rate as 
percentage 
of band 
earnings 
Total earnings (£ per year) 
 £10,000 £20,000 £30,000 £40,000 £50,000 
8% 3.5% 5.7% 6.5% 6.9% 5.7% 
10% 4.3% 7.2% 8.1% 8.6% 7.2% 
12% 5.2% 8.6% 9.7% 10.3% 8.6% 
14% 6.1% 10% 11.4% 12% 10% 
16% 6.9% 11.5% 13% 13.7% 11.5% 
18% 7.8% 12.9% 14.6% 15.4% 12.9% 
20% 8.7% 14.3% 16.2% 17.2% 14.3% 
 
The introduction of automatic enrolment into private pensions from 2012 is 
likely to increase the number of people saving into a DC pension. With over 
80% of DB schemes now closed to new members or future accruals the 
majority of employers are expected to select a DC pension as their qualifying 
scheme.28  
 
The predominance of DC provision in the private sector may have 
implications for future levels of retirement income adequacy given that 
members in a DC scheme bear all the risks of pension provision. Also, there 
are different factors that may affect total savings into a DC scheme. 
 
There are important factors affecting retirement income from a DC pension 
In a typical DC scheme, a fund is built up on behalf of the member with 
contributions from the employer and/or the member. Retirement income will 
then vary depending on a number of factors, such as: 
· The level of contributions. 
· The consistency of contributions. 
· The investment return achieved by the fund. This depends on the 
investment strategy of the fund as well as on the market returns on the 
involved investment classes. 
· The charges levied against the accumulated fund. 
· The type of annuity purchased to convert a pension pot into an income 
stream. 
 
The level of contributions is one of the most important factors affecting total 
savings in a DC scheme. Following the introduction of automatic enrolment 
into private pensions from 2012, whether employees and employers decide to 
contribute at the legal minimum of 8% of band earnings or at higher rates may 
have a substantial impact on total pension savings. Previous PPI research has 
found that raising total contributions from the legal minimum of 8% of band 
 
28 PPF-TPR (2012) 
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earnings to 12% for a median earning man could increase the replacement rate 
from around 54% of their average earnings in the five years previous to 
retirement to around 63%.29 However this estimate assumed a fixed return and 
did not allow for uncertainty. 
 
Given that DC retirement income depends heavily on contributions, whether 
an individual has a short or long history of contributions can also affect 
retirement income. When considering an individual contribution history, three 
aspects must be taken into account: 
· The age at which a member starts contributing to a DC scheme. 
Because contributions are used to build up a fund that achieves a 
certain return every year, if a member starts saving at an early age they 
may achieve a higher retirement income than if starting to save later in 
their working life. 
· Whether a member has career breaks. Generally, members do not 
make contributions to a DC scheme while being unemployed and this 
may lead to a smaller pension pot.  
· The age at which a member retires. All things being equal, a longer 
contribution history will generally help to build a large DC fund. 
Previous PPI research has found that a median earning man retiring 
two years later than their SPA could increase the replacement rate for a 
median earner from around 54% of their average earnings in the five 
years previous to retirement to around 58%. Retiring later has a 
twofold benefit. It increases the size of the fund and it also helps to 
obtain a higher retirement income because of the deferment in the 
purchase of an annuity. 
 
The investment strategy may also affect total DC savings. Investment 
strategies in which funds are heavily invested in assets with fixed or 
predictable returns, such as bonds, will tend to minimise risk, however this 
may be at the expense of long-term returns. Investment strategies which are 
instead heavily invested in growth-seeking assets, such as equities, will tend 
to carry more risk and volatility for the member but may offer more 
opportunities for long-term returns. There is no optimal investment strategy 
for a default fund in DC. In practice a wide range of investment strategies and 
asset allocations are being used by pension providers and employers, both in 
the growth phase and in the de-risking phase ahead of retirement.  
 
Finally, the charges applied to a DC fund can also affect retirement income. 
Members of DC schemes typically pay an annual management charge (AMC), 
which is levied against the accumulated fund every year. All other factors 
being equal, a higher level of management charges reduces the amount of 
money in the pension fund at retirement. The effect of the management charge 
is compounded for every year of saving, so even relatively small changes in 
the level of the AMC can have a significant impact on the members’ fund by 
the time they reach retirement.  
 
29 PPI (2012) 
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How adequate are contributions? 
Taking into account the key role of the contribution rate, the consistency of 
contributions and the investment strategy adopted by a DC scheme member 
to determine retirement income adequacy, this report aims to explore the 
following research questions in the UK context following the introduction of 
automatic enrolment into workplace pensions: 
· What range of retirement incomes might individuals be able to achieve 
by making only the minimum required level of contributions? How 
does this compare to a pre-specified adequacy threshold? 
· What level of contribution rate is required for an individual to have a 
“good chance” of achieving an adequate level of retirement income? 
 
The analysis in this report will consider the adequacy of retirement income for 
different individuals that are automatically enrolled into a DC pension once 
automatic enrolment is fully rolled out in 2018 under different scenarios. 
Given that the single-tier state pension would be implemented by the time 
these individuals are automatically enrolled, replacement rates will be used to 
measure the adequacy of retirement income. 
 
The next chapter lays out the methodology employed in this research. The 
subsequent analysis shows the probability of individuals reaching a target 
replacement income under different scenarios if contributing at the minimum 
required by the legislation. The analysis also shows the contribution rate 
necessary to have a good chance of achieving a target replacement income. 
 
Summary 
Adequacy can be defined as to what extent individuals have a retirement 
income that fulfils their basic needs or to what extent retirement income 
allows individuals to replicate the standards of living they had while in 
working life. 
 
Poverty thresholds and minimum income standards can be useful to assess 
whether individuals have an income that allows them to fulfil their basic 
needs. The introduction of the single-tier pension from 2016 may imply that 
future pensioners could have incomes from their state pension above the 
relative poverty threshold of 60% of median income or the minimum income 
standard. However, being above the poverty threshold does not necessary 
imply that pensioners may have an income that allows them to replicate the 
standards of living they had while in working life.  
 
Replacement rates may be more useful to assess whether pensioners may be 
able to replicate their working life living standards. This report uses 
replacement rates similar to those set out by the Pension Commission to assess 
the adequacy of retirement income for different individuals under different 
scenarios. 
 
The landscape of pension provision in the private sector in the UK has 
changed in recent years with a majority of active members in a DC pension 
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scheme. With over 80% of DB schemes now closed to new members or future 
accruals the majority of employers are expected to select a DC pension as their 
qualifying scheme.  
 
A number of factors may affect retirement income from DC pensions such as 
the contribution rate, the consistency of contributions, the investment strategy 
followed and the charges levied against the fund.  
 19 
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Chapter 2: How often could minimum contributions 
result in an adequate retirement income? 
 
This chapter analyses the range of outcomes of individuals achieving an 
adequate retirement income if they contribute at the minimum level of 8% of 
band earnings, following the introduction of automatic enrolment. 
 
The chapter begins by describing the different individuals and the 
combination of characteristics that will be considered under the baseline and 
alternative scenarios. The chapter then describes the methodological approach 
used and the results.   
 
The different individuals modelled 
The analysis in this chapter and subsequent ones is based on the modelling of 
scenarios. Each scenario considers the working life of a hypothetical 
individual who is automatically enrolled into a DC workplace pension in 2018, 
once automatic enrolment is fully rolled out.  
 
The range of retirement income that individuals could achieve if being 
automatically enrolled into a workplace pension will vary according to 
different individuals’ characteristics such as: 
· their earnings levels during their working life; 
· the investment strategy followed while contributing to a DC pension 
scheme and the charges levied by the scheme; 
· when individuals start saving and when they decide to retire. 
 
Taking into account these factors, three individuals with low, median and 
higher earnings profiles are modelled (Box 2).  
 
Box 2: Individuals and scenarios 
The low earner individual is assumed to earn at the 30th percentile of age-
specific economy-wide earnings. 
The median earner individual is assumed to earn at the 50th percentile of age-
specific economy-wide earnings. 
The higher earner individual is assumed to earn at the 70th percentile of age-
specific economy-wide earnings. 
 
Baseline scenario 
Under the baseline scenario, each individual is assumed to start saving at age 
22 in 2018, once automatic enrolment is fully rolled out, and to retire at their 
State Pension Age (SPA) in 2064. 
 
Each individual is assumed to follow a traditional lifestyle investment 
approach. Under this approach, the funds in which pension contributions are 
invested are changed automatically depending on the length of time to the 
expected retirement date. Members’ funds are invested in equities and 
switched to gilts and cash as the individual approaches retirement. 
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Alternative scenarios 
A first alternative scenario considers each individual following an investment 
approach with lower volatility in early years at the expense of potential 
returns. Under this strategy, a fund is mostly composed of low risk assets in 
the years right after members start saving. The fund then switches to higher 
risk return-seeking assets as a member gets older, although keeping a mix of 
equities and gilts. The fund switches to gilts in the years close to retirement. 
 
A second alternative scenario considers each individual following an 
investment approach that aims to reduce volatility but not at the expense of 
lower returns. This is done by reducing equity volatility within a traditional 
lifestyle approach. In practice, this could be achieved through active 
management or greater asset diversification with a progressive switch to gilts 
and cash as the member nears retirement. For example, Diversified Growth 
Funds (DGF) aim to reduce volatility by hedging different asset classes, so 
that when some asset values fall others increase. 70% of the FTSE 100 
companies now offer Diversified Growth Funds (DGF’s) as part of the fund 
range in their DC pension schemes.30 
 
Three further scenarios model a median earner following a traditional lifestyle 
investment approach and: 
· Taking a career break: the individual is assumed to start saving at age 
22. Between the ages of 32 and 39 he/she takes time off to care for 
children. He/she returns part-time at age 39 earning at 50% of full-
time earnings. He/she returns to full employment at age 41 and retires 
at his/her State Pension Age (SPA). 
· Starting to save later in life: the individual is assumed to start saving at 
age 40. 
· Retiring some years after SPA: the individual is assumed to retire two 
years after SPA. 
 
Unless specified, in all different scenarios an Annual Management Charge 
(AMC) of 0.5% is assumed as a baseline. This is consistent with the recent 
Office for Fair Trading report, which found that the average AMC for new 
auto-enrolment schemes is 0.51% of the fund.31 This assumes that the level of 
the AMC being levied on members is independent from the investment 
strategy approach. Some investment approaches, including the use of active 
management and Diversified Growth Funds, will generally carry higher 
charges. However, the link between charges and investment performance is 
complex, and so these interdependencies have not been modelled here.  
 
Methodological approach 
The analysis uses the PPI Individual Model, which has been adapted to use 
stochastic modelling techniques, based on a model developed by the 
Department of Mathematics at King’s College London. The Individual Model 
 
30 See TowersWatson (2012) “FTSE 100 DC schemes choose Diversified Growth Funds.” 
31 OFT (2013) p.19 
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projects future state and private pension income for hypothetical individuals 
with different characteristics. The outputs from this model are used to 
calculate the State Pension entitlement of the different individuals modelled, 
based on the recently announced State Pension reforms which introduce a 
single-tier state pension. 
 
Investment returns from private pensions, inflation and average earnings 
growth are modelled stochastically allowing annual investment returns in 
individuals’ funds to fluctuate each year. Each individual is run 100,000 times 
with different economic scenarios. This illustrates the variability around 
investment returns and economic variables year on year. Therefore, using 
stochastic modelling instead of fixed investment return modelling provides a 
measure of the uncertainty of achieving an adequate retirement income.32 
 
The analysis in this report compares retirement incomes for different 
individuals against target replacement incomes, similar to those set out by the 
Pensions Commission’s target replacement rates. Replacement rates are 
calculated as the ratio of retirement income at State Pension Age (SPA) or 5 or 
10 years after SPA, to the average earnings in the 10 years previous to 
retirement, adjusted by average earnings growth. 
 
The investment approaches modelled in this report 
The modelling of the investment approaches used in this report is highly 
stylised and not intended to represent any particular fund, so the 
different investment approaches modelled do not aim to replicate any of 
the current options available in the market such as specific traditional 
lifestyle pension products, the National Employment Savings Trust 
(NEST) funds or any type of Diversified Growth Funds.33 
 
The modelling in this report does not assume any behavioural effects in 
the different investment approaches. For example, higher or lower 
volatility levels do not affect member contribution rates. 
 
Retirement income from private pensions 
This section analyses private pension incomes for different individuals if 
contributing at the legal minimum of 8% of band earnings. Looking at private 
pensions in isolation allows identifying the dispersion of incomes and their 
sensitivity to different earnings levels and different investment strategies. 
 
In practice, the income from private pensions will be affected by factors such 
as the annuity rate used to convert an individual’s pension pot into a 
retirement income, the evolution of earnings growth relative to investment 
returns and the inflation rate. To directly observe the impact of contributions 
on the size of an individual’s pension fund, Chart 1 shows the distribution of 
the size of a hypothetical pension fund if £1,000 were contributed every year 
 
32 More details on the economic modelling can be found in Annex 1. 
33 Fore example, NEST funds use a mix of capital protection in early years and a diversified growth 
approach. See NEST (2012) 
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at the end of 46 years under a traditional lifestyle investment approach. A total 
of 46 years is used as this is similar to the total number of years that an 
individual aged 22 who is automatically enrolled in 2018 would contribute to 
a pension until reaching their SPA at age 68. An annual management charge 
(AMC) of 0.5% of the fund is assumed. 
 
Chart 134 
 
 
There is a range of outcomes in the fund size after 46 years. The median fund 
size is around £254,800. And the size ranges from around £85,100 in the 5th 
percentile to £904,300 in the 95th percentile.35  
 
Chart 1 illustrates the variability of fund sizes. However, the adequacy of 
retirement income will depend on a number of other factors as well as on the 
variability of the fund size. These include investment returns relative to price 
and earnings inflation after charges, annuity rates available at the time of 
retirement and inflation after retirement. In the rest of this report we therefore 
consider the probability of achieving the target replacement income, which 
takes all of these factors, and how they differ between scenarios, into account.  
 
The outcome from saving into a pension is uncertain  
The previous analysis indicates that the outcome from saving into a pension 
will be uncertain. Therefore, when taking into consideration the income from 
private pensions, there is a range of possible retirement incomes. Chart 2 
shows the dispersion of private pension retirement incomes for a median 
 
34 PPI and King’s College London modelling analysis 
35 Values rounded to nearest £100 
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earning individual under the baseline scenario of being automatically enrolled 
at age 22, retiring at State Pension Age (SPA) and following a traditional 
lifestyle investment approach, if contributing at the legal minimum of 8% of 
band earnings. The chart shows the probability of achieving the target 
replacement income through income from private pensions for the modelled 
individuals. 
 
Chart 236 
PPI
PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTERetirement income from private 
pensions is uncertain
Probability of retirement income from private pensions at SPA for a 
median earner that starts saving at age 22, retires at SPA and follows a 
traditional lifestyle investment approach, if contributing at 8% of band 
earnings.  
 
 
The range of incomes is very wide. In 8% of the cases generated in the 
modelling, a median earner could meet their target replacement income from 
private pension saving alone, even at minimum contribution levels. In more 
than 90% of the cases generated in the modelling income is below the target 
replacement income, and in 25% of cases private pension income was less than 
26% of the target replacement income. 
 
Investment approaches affect private pension incomes 
Different investment strategies may affect incomes from private pensions. In 
automatic enrolment, many individuals will stay in default funds, with a 
pension scheme chosen by their employer. This default fund could be based 
on one of a number different investment approaches. 
 
To observe more directly the impact of alternative investment strategies, 
Charts 3 and 4 show the distribution of the size of a hypothetical fund after 5 
 
36 PPI and King’s College London modelling analysis. The last bar in the chart shows the probability of a 
retirement income of that is four or more times the income adequacy benchmark. 
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and 46 years of making annual contributions of £1,000. An AMC of 0.5% of the 
fund is assumed. 
 
Chart 337
 
 
Chart 438 
PPI
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Investment approaches affect the 
distribution of fund sizes after 46 
years of contributions
Distribution of fund sizes after 46 years of contributing £1000 per year 
under the lifestyle investment approach
 
 
37 PPI and King’s College London modelling analysis 
38 PPI and King’s College London modelling analysis 
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Both of the alternative approaches provide more certainty in outcomes, with a 
more narrow distribution and more outcomes closer to the median outcome. 
Both, however, have fewer very high outcomes.  
 
After five years of contributions the distribution of outcomes is narrower 
under a first alternative approach that aims to reduce volatility in early years 
at the expense of potential returns than under a traditional lifestyle approach. 
The outcomes range from around £4,500 in the 5th percentile to around £6,500 
in the 95th percentile, with a median size of around £5,400. By contrast, a 
second alternative approach that aims to reduce volatility but not at the 
expense of potential returns provides a higher median size of around £5,900, 
but the possible outcomes range from £4,700 in the 5th percentile to £7,500 in 
the 95th percentile.  
 
After 46 years of contributions, the distribution of outcomes is also narrower 
under a first alternative approach that aims to reduce volatility in early years 
at the expense of potential returns than under a traditional lifestyle approach. 
The outcomes range from around £84,500 in the 5th percentile to around 
£545,500 in the 95th percentile, with a median size of around £204,500. By 
contrast, a second alternative approach that aims to reduce volatility but not at 
the expense of potential returns provides a higher median size of around 
£264,000, but the possible outcomes range from £116,000 in the 5th percentile to 
£640,000 in the 95th percentile. 
 
While this is a highly stylised analysis, it shows that the different investment 
strategies could affect the distribution of pension incomes.  
 
Table 4 shows the variation in the income from private pensions as a 
proportion of target replacement income for a median earner under the 
baseline scenario of starting to save at age 22 and retiring at SPA, if 
contributing at the legal minimum of 8% of band earnings. The three different 
investment strategies are all assumed to have an annual management charge 
of 0.5%. 
 
There is some variation in the median retirement income under the different 
investment approaches. The median retirement income under a traditional 
lifestyle approach is around 39% of the target replacement income, compared 
to 34% under the first alternative approach and 40% under the second 
alternative approach.  
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Table 4: Distribution of private pension retirement incomes (as a percentage 
of target replacement income) for a median earner that starts saving at age 
22 and retires at SPA if contributing at the minimum rate of 8% of band 
earnings, under different investment approaches39 
 
Investment approach Median 10th percentile 90th percentile 
Traditional lifestyle 39% 20% 90% 
First alternative 34% 20% 63% 
Second alternative 40% 23% 77% 
 
There is more variation in the range of possible retirement incomes under the 
different investment approaches. Under a traditional lifestyle approach 
retirement incomes could range from 20% of the target replacement income in 
the 10th percentile to around 90% in the 90th percentile. Under the first 
alternative approach that aims to reduce volatility in early years at the 
expense of potential returns there is less dispersion of possible retirement 
incomes compared to a traditional lifestyle approach, ranging from around 
20% in the 10th percentile to around 63% in the 90th percentile. Under the 
second alternative approach that aims to reduce volatility but not at the 
expense of potential returns there is more dispersion than under the first 
alternative approach but less than under a traditional lifestyle approach. The 
possible incomes range from around 23% of the target replacement income in 
the 10th percentile to around 77% in the 90th percentile.  
 
Retirement income from private pensions may be sensitive to the level of 
charges 
In practice, different investment approaches may not only provide different 
levels of returns and volatility but they may also apply different levels of 
management charges (AMC) to a DC fund. This in turn will affect retirement 
incomes. For example, an investment approach that aims to reduce volatility 
but not at the expense of potential returns, could have higher charges than a 
traditional lifestyle approach.40 Chart 5 illustrates the variation in median 
retirement incomes from private pensions under different investment 
approaches and with different annual management charges.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 PPI and King’s College London modelling analysis. 
40 LCP (2013), p.11. 
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Chart 541 
 
 
A median earner following a traditional lifestyle approach under the baseline 
of starting to save at age 22 and retiring at SPA could reach a median 
retirement income at SPA from private pensions that would be around 39% of 
the target replacement income with an AMC of 0.5%. This could reduce to 
around 34% with an AMC of 1%.  
 
The median income could be around 34% of the target replacement income 
under a first alternative approach that aims to reduce volatility at the expense 
of potential returns with an AMC of 0.5%, but this falls to around 30% if the 
AMC is 1%. 
 
Under a second alternative approach that reduces volatility but not at the 
expense of potential returns, the median income would be around 40% of the 
target replacement income with an AMC of 0.5%, but this falls to around 35% 
with an AMC of 1%. 
 
The level of AMC also has an impact on the distribution of possible retirement 
incomes (Table 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 PPI and King’s College London modelling analysis. 
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The charges from different investment 
approaches may affect retirement 
incomes from private pensions
Median private pension retirement incomes (as a percentage of target 
replacement income) for a median earner that starts saving at age 22 and 
retires at SPA, if contributing at the minimum total rate of 8% of band 
earnings under different annual management charge (AMC) levels
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Table 5: Distribution of private pension retirement incomes (as a percentage 
of target replacement income) for a median earner that starts saving at age 
22 and retires at SPA if contributing at the minimum rate of 8% of band 
earnings, under different investment approaches and AMC levels42 
Investment 
approach 
AMC Median 10th percentile 90th percentile 
Traditional 
lifestyle 
0.5% 39% 20% 90% 
1% 34% 18% 78% 
First alternative 0.5% 34% 20% 63% 
1% 30% 18% 55% 
Second 
alternative 
0.5% 40% 23% 77% 
1% 35% 20% 66% 
 
A higher AMC reduces the median retirement income. It also reduces the 
dispersion of possible retirement incomes.  
 
Under a traditional lifestyle investment approach with an AMC of 0.5%, a 
median earner could reach a median retirement income from private pensions 
that would be around 39% of the target replacement income, and the range of 
possible retirement income outcomes would vary from 20% in the 10th 
percentile to 90% in the 90th percentile. By contrast, if the AMC is 1%, then the 
median retirement income reduces to 34% of the target replacement income, 
with the dispersion of possible retirement incomes ranging from 18% to 78% 
of the target replacement income. 
 
Under a first alternative approach with an AMC of 0.5%, a median earner 
could reach a median retirement income from private pensions that would be 
around 34% of the target replacement income, and the range of possible 
retirement income outcomes would vary from 20% in the 10th percentile to 
63% in the 90th percentile. By contrast, if the AMC is 1%, then the median 
retirement income reduces to 30% of the target replacement income, with the 
dispersion of possible retirement incomes ranging from 18% to 55% of the 
target replacement income. 
 
Under a second alternative approach with an AMC of 0.5%, a median earner 
could reach a median retirement income from private pensions that would be 
around 40% of the target replacement income, and the range of possible 
retirement income outcomes would vary from 23% in the 10th percentile to 
77% in the 90th percentile. By contrast, if the AMC is 1%, then the median 
retirement income reduces to 35% of the target replacement income, with the 
dispersion of possible retirement incomes ranging from 20% to 66% of the 
target replacement income. 
 
 
 
 
 
42 PPI and King’s College London modelling analysis. 
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The adequacy of total retirement income 
In order to gauge whether the level of private pension income generated is 
enough to achieve an adequate retirement income, income from state pensions 
must also be taken into account. Therefore, this section analyses the adequacy 
of total retirement income, including the income from private pensions and 
from the single-tier state pension for different individuals if contributing at 
the legal minimum of 8% of band earnings. 
 
There is a wide range of total retirement incomes 
Chart 6 shows the distribution of possible total retirement incomes from 
private and state pensions for a median earner under the baseline scenario of 
being automatically enrolled at age 22, retiring at SPA and following a 
traditional lifestyle investment approach, if contributing at the legal minimum 
of 8% of band earnings. The analysis assumes that the single-tier pension is 
uprated by the triple lock of the higher of changes in average earnings, the 
Consumer Prices Index (CPI) or 2.5%, the mechanism that is currently being 
used to uprate the Basic State Pension. This is also consistent with the 
Government’s White Paper on the single-tier state pension published on 14 
January 2013, which used the triple lock to uprate the single-tier pension every 
year. The level of the single-tier state pension for each case modelled will 
depend on the evolution of earnings and inflation growth. 
 
Chart 643 
PPI
PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTERetirement income from private 
and state pensions is uncertain
Probability of retirement incomes from state and private pensions at SPA 
for a median earner that starts saving at age 22, retires at SPA and follows a 
traditional lifestyle investment approach, if contributing at 8% of band 
earnings  
 
 
 
43 PPI and King’s College London modelling analysis. The last bar represents the sum of the probabilities of 
achieving a retirement income that is four times the target replacement income or higher 
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In 49% of the cases generated in the modelling a median earner reaches their 
target replacement income with income from private pensions and from the 
single-tier state pension combined. In more than half of the scenarios 
modelled income is below the target replacement income and in 25% of the 
scenarios income from private and state pensions was less than 75% of the 
target replacement income.  
 
Chart 6 also shows that there is a 0% probability of a median earner having a 
retirement income that is less than 55% of their target replacement income. 
This is because the income from private and state pensions will represent at 
least 55% of a median earner’s target replacement income.  
 
Lower earners are more likely to achieve their target replacement income 
Under the baseline scenario, the probability of individuals achieving their 
target replacement income through their state and private pensions varies 
according to their earnings profile. Lower earners have a higher probability of 
achieving their target replacement income than median or higher earners. This 
is because the single-tier state pension represents a higher proportion of lower 
earners’ pre-retirement earnings than for median or higher earners (Chart 7). 
 
Chart 744 
PPI
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The probability of achieving the 
target replacement income varies 
by earnings level
Probability of achieving the target replacement income with income from 
private and state pensions for different individuals, if starting to save at 
age 22, retire at SPA follow a traditional lifestyle investment approach and 
contributing at the minimum total 8% of band earnings
 
 
Under the baseline scenario of starting to save at age 22, retiring at SPA and 
following a traditional lifestyle investment approach, a lower earner has a 63% 
probability of achieving their target replacement income, compared to 49% for 
a median earner and to 40% for a higher earner.  
 
44 PPI and King’s College London modelling analysis. 
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The probability of achieving a target replacement income may increase in 
the years after retirement 
Individuals are more likely to have an income above their target replacement 
income level 5 and 10 years after SPA. This is because of the triple locked 
indexation of the single-tier state pension, which increases the value of the 
single pension relative to target replacement income levels over time. The 
model also assumes that the target replacement income increases in line with 
changes in the Consumer Prices Index (Chart 8). 
 
Chart 845 
 
 
A lower earner has a 63% probability of achieving their target replacement 
income at SPA, but this increases to around 88% 10 years after retirement. This 
compares to around 40% for a higher earner at SPA and 48% 10 years after 
retirement.  
 
The indexation of the single-tier pension may affect individuals’ chances of 
reaching their target replacement income 
The triple lock indexation mechanism for the single-tier state pension is more 
generous than just average earnings because in years of low inflation or 
earnings growth, the single-tier pension would increase by at least 2.5%. 
Current legislation stipulates that the Basic State Pension must be uprated at 
least in line with changes in average earnings. Once the single-tier pension is 
introduced in 2016, it will be up to the government of the day to decide 
whether anything more than average earnings is needed. 
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Whether the single-tier state pension is indexed by the triple lock or just by 
average earnings can affect the future adequacy of total retirement income for 
different individuals (Chart 9). 
 
Chart 946 
 
 
The probability of achieving the target replacement income for the different 
individuals under the baseline scenario of starting to save at age 22, retiring at 
SPA and following a traditional lifestyle investment approach reduces 
significantly if the single-tier state pension is uprated only by changes in 
average earnings. 
 
For a lower earner, the probability of achieving their target replacement 
income decreases from around 63%, if the single-tier state pension is uprated 
by the triple lock to around 36% if the single-tier pension is uprated by 
changes in average earnings. For a median earner the probability of achieving 
the target replacement income decreases from 49% to 30% and for a higher 
earner the probability decreases from around 40% to 28%. 
 
Changes in contribution patterns affect retirement income adequacy 
Different changes in contribution patterns such as taking career breaks, 
starting to save later in life or retiring some years after SPA may affect the 
probability of reaching a target replacement income with income from private 
and state pensions. The effect will also depend on whether the single-tier state 
pension is uprated by the triple lock or by just changes in average earnings 
(Chart 10).  
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Chart 1047 
 
 
Under the baseline scenario and with the single-tier state pension uprated by 
the triple lock, a median earner starting to save at age 22, retiring at SPA and 
following a traditional lifestyle approach may reach a 49% probability of 
achieving their target replacement income. This falls to 30% if the single-tier 
state pension is uprated by changes in average earnings. 
 
If the median earner starts saving at age 22 but takes a career break from age 
32 to 39, the probability of achieving their target replacement income at SPA 
falls to around 34%, compared to 49% under the baseline. However, this falls 
to 16% if the single-tier state pension is uprated by average earnings, a 
reduction of more than a half compared to the outcome with triple lock 
indexation for the single-tier state pension. 
 
If the median earner starts to save at age 40 instead of 22, the probability of 
achieving their target replacement income falls to around 5% if the single-tier 
state pension is uprated by the triple lock, compared to 49% under the 
baseline. The probability of achieving the target replacement income falls to 
around 1% if the single-tier state pension is uprated by the triple lock. 
 
By contrast, if the median earner decides to retire two years after their SPA, 
the probability of achieving their target replacement income increases to 
around 59%, compared to 49% under the baseline, if the triple lock is used to 
uprate the single-tier state pension. However, the probability falls to around 
38% if changes in average earnings are used to uprate the single-tier state 
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pension; a reduction of more than a third compared to the outcome under 
triple lock indexation for the single-tier state pension. 
 
Summary 
This chapter has found that there is variation in incomes from private 
pensions and in the adequacy of incomes from private and state pensions 
under different scenarios. For example: 
· There is a wide range of retirement incomes from private pensions 
alone. In 8% of the cases generated in the modelling, median earning 
individuals could meet their target replacement income from private 
pension saving alone, even at minimum contribution levels. However, 
in 25% of the cases private pension income provides individuals with 
less than 26% of the target replacement income.  
· There is variation in the range of possible retirement incomes from 
private pensions alone under different investment approaches. Under 
a traditional lifestyle approach retirement incomes could range from 
20% of the target replacement income in the 10th percentile to around 
90% in the 90th percentile. Under the first alternative approach that 
aims to reduce volatility in early years at the expense of potential 
returns there is less dispersion of possible retirement incomes 
compared to a traditional lifestyle approach, ranging from around 20% 
in the 10th percentile to around 63% in the 90th percentile. Under the 
second alternative approach that aims to reduce volatility but not at 
the expense of potential returns there is more dispersion than under 
the first alternative approach but less than under a traditional lifestyle 
approach. The possible incomes range from around 23% of the target 
replacement income in the 10th percentile to around 77% in the 90th 
percentile. 
· Retirement incomes are also sensitive to the level of charges paid. For 
example, a median earner following a traditional lifestyle approach 
under the baseline of starting to save at age 22 and retiring at SPA 
could reach a median retirement income at SPA from private pensions 
that would be around 39% of the target replacement income with an 
AMC of 0.5%. This could reduce to around 34% with an AMC of 1%. 
The level of the AMC paid also has an impact on the distribution of 
possible retirement incomes. 
· There is a wide range of total retirement incomes and in 49% of the 
cases generated in the modelling a median earner reaches their target 
replacement income with income from private and state pensions. 
· Lower earners are more likely to achieve their target replacement 
income. This is because the single-tier state pension represents a higher 
proportion of lower earners’ pre-retirement earnings than for median 
or higher earners. 
· The probability of achieving the target replacement income increases 
in the years after retirement, mainly due to the indexation mechanism 
for the single-tier state pension. However, whether the single-tier state 
pension is indexed to average earnings or to the triple lock of the 
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higher of average earnings, changes in the Consumer Prices Index or 
2.5% from 2016 onwards may affect the adequacy of total retirement 
income in the future. 
· Changes in contribution patterns such as taking career breaks or 
starting to save later in life affect the adequacy of total retirement 
income. The effect will also depend on whether the single-tier state 
pension is uprated by the triple lock or by changes in average earnings 
alone. Under the baseline scenario of starting to save at age 22, retiring 
at SPA and with the single-tier state pension uprated by the triple lock, 
a median earner could have a 49% probability of achieving their target 
replacement income. This falls to around 30% if the single-tier state 
pension is uprated by changes in average earnings.  
· Taking career breaks and starting to save at age 40 reduce the 
probability of achieving the target replacement rate. By contrast, 
retiring two years after SPA increases the probability of a median 
earner achieving their target replacement income to 59% if the single-
tier pension is triple locked and to 38% if it is earnings-linked 
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Chapter 3: What contribution rates would be 
necessary to achieve an adequate retirement 
income? 
 
Chapter 2 has highlighted that contributing at the minimum of 8% of band 
earnings may not be enough to have a good chance of achieving the target 
replacement income. This chapter analyses the contribution rates that would 
be necessary for different individuals to have a good chance of achieving their 
target replacement income considering their total retirement income from 
state and private pensions. The analysis considers different scenarios of 
investment approach, earnings levels and changes in contribution patterns. 
 
A higher contribution rate increases the probability of achieving a target 
replacement income, but this will depend on the indexation mechanism for 
the single-tier state pension    
The contribution rate is one of the main factors affecting the adequacy of total 
retirement income from state and private pensions. For all the different 
individuals, under the baseline scenario of an individual starting to save at 
age 22, following a traditional lifestyle investment approach and retiring at 
SPA, a higher contribution rate is likely to increase the probability of reaching 
their target replacement rate. However, this is affected by the indexation 
mechanism used to uprate the single-tier state pension (Chart 11). 
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A lower earner contributing at 10% of band earnings has a 74% probability of 
achieving their target replacement income at State Pension Age (SPA) if the 
single-tier state pension is uprated by the triple lock of the higher of changes 
in average earnings, CPI or 2.5%. However this falls to 50% if changes in 
average earnings are used to uprate the single-tier pension.  
 
Individuals will need different contribution rate levels to achieve a two-thirds 
(66%) or three-quarters (75%) chance of reaching their target replacement 
income if the triple lock is used to uprate the single-tier pension (Chart 12). 
 
Chart 1249 
 
 
A lower earner will need a total contribution rate of 9% of band earnings to 
have a two-thirds (66%) probability of achieving their target replacement 
income. By contrast, a median earner will need to contribute at least 11% of 
band earnings and a higher earner will need to contribute at least 12% of band 
earnings to have a two-thirds probability of achieving their target replacement 
income.  
 
A lower earner will need a total contribution rate of 11% of band earnings to 
have a three-quarters (75%) chance of achieving their target replacement 
income. By contrast, a median earner will need to contribute 12% of band 
earnings and a higher earner will need to contribute 14%. 
 
The lower contribution rate needed for a lower earner to have a good chance 
of achieving their target replacement income is related to the fact that the full 
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single-tier pension will represent a higher proportion of a lower earner pre-
retirement income than for a median or higher earner. Therefore, a lower 
earner will need to contribute less to a private pension than a median earner 
or a higher earner to top up their retirement income and reach their target 
replacement income. However, if the single-tier state pension is uprated by 
changes in average earnings, individuals will need higher contribution rates to 
have a good chance of reaching their target replacement income (Chart 13). 
 
Chart 1350 
 
 
A lower earner will need a contribution rate of 13% of band earnings to have a 
two-thirds chance of reaching their target replacement income with the 
income from state and private pensions if the single-tier state pension is 
uprated by changes in average earnings, compared to 9% if the single-tier 
pension is uprated by the triple lock. By contrast median and higher earners 
will need a total contribution rate of 14% and 15%, compared to 11% and 12% 
if the single-tier state pension is uprated by the triple lock. 
 
A lower earner will need a total contribution rate of 15% of band earnings to 
have a three-quarters chance of achieving their target replacement income if 
the single-tier state pension is uprated by changes in average earnings. By 
contrast, median and higher earners will need to contribute 17% of band 
earnings each to have a three-quarters chance of reaching their target 
replacement income, compared to 14% and 15% if the single-tier state pension 
is uprated by the triple lock. 
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Different investment approaches affect the contribution rate needed to 
achieve an adequate retirement income 
Different investment approaches would entail different levels of annual 
management charges (AMC) applied to an individual’s fund. This, along with 
the indexation mechanism used for the single-tier state pension, could affect 
the contribution rate needed to achieve an adequate retirement income. Table 
6 illustrates this variation by focusing on a median earner that starts saving at 
age 22 and retires at SPA under different levels of AMC and under different 
indexation mechanisms for the single-tier state pension. 
 
Table 6: Total contribution rates needed (as a % of band earnings) to reach a 
two-thirds or three-quarters probability of achieving the target replacement 
income at SPA with income from private and state pensions for a median 
earner that starts saving at age 22 and retires at SPA51 
  Single-tier triple 
locked 
Single-tier earnings 
linked 
Probability 
of achieving 
the target 
replacement 
income 
Investment 
approach 
AMC: 
0.5% 
AMC:  
1% 
AMC: 
0.5% 
AMC:  
1% 
Two-thirds  Traditional 
lifestyle 
11% 12% 14% 16% 
First 
alternative 
12% 14% 16% 17% 
Second 
alternative 
10% 12% 14% 15% 
Three-
quarters 
Traditional 
lifestyle 
13% 15% 17% 18% 
First 
alternative 
14% 15% 17% 19% 
Second 
alternative 
12% 14% 15% 17% 
 
The contributions required do vary between the different stylised investment 
strategies modelled. However, the contributions required do not change 
significantly with the alternatives, generally either one percentage point 
higher or lower than under a traditional lifestyle approach. The contributions 
required are more sensitive to both charges and the indexation mechanism for 
the single-tier state pension. 
 
The range of outcomes taking into account changes in all these factors is large. 
For example, the total contribution required to reach a two-thirds chance of 
achieving the target replacement income ranges from 10% in a low charging 
scheme with a triple locked state pension to 17% in a higher charging scheme 
 
51 PPI and King’s College London modelling analysis 
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using a different investment approach and where the state pension is earnings 
linked. 
 
The contribution rates needed to have a three-quarters chance of achieving the 
target replacement income are higher under all investment approaches and 
levels of AMC. 
 
Changes in contribution patterns will affect the contribution rate necessary 
to have a good chance of achieving the target replacement income 
Changes in contribution patterns such as taking career breaks, starting to save 
later in life and retiring two years after an individual’s SPA may affect the 
probability of an individual reaching their target replacement income. 
Consequently, individuals will need different contribution rates to have a two-
thirds chance of reaching their target replacement income. This will also be 
affected by the indexation mechanism used to uprate the single-tier state 
pension (Chart 14). 
 
Chart 1452 
 
 
If the single-tier state pension is uprated by the triple lock, a median earner 
needs a total contribution rate of 11% of band earnings to have a two-thirds 
chance of reaching their target replacement income, under the baseline 
scenario of starting to save at age 22 and retiring at SPA. If the median earner 
takes a career break the contribution rate necessary to have a two-thirds 
chance of reaching the target replacement income increases to 14%, and to 23% 
if the median earner starts saving at age 40. By contrast, if the median earner 
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starts to save at age 22 but retires two years after their SPA, they will need a 
total contribution rate of 9% to have a two-thirds chance of reaching their 
target replacement income, compared to 9% under the baseline scenario. 
If the single-tier state pension is uprated by changes in average earnings, a 
median earner will need higher levels of contributions to have a two-thirds 
chance of reaching their target replacement income. Under the baseline 
scenario of starting saving at age 22 and retiring at SPA, the contribution rate 
needed will be 14%, compared to 11% if the triple lock is used to uprate the 
single-tier pension. If the median earner takes career breaks they will need a 
total contribution rate of 18% and of 27% if the median earner starts saving at 
age 40 and retires at SPA. By contrast, if the median earner starts saving at age 
22 and retires two years after their SPA, they will need a total contribution rate 
of 13% of band earnings, compared to 14% under the baseline scenario. 
 
Individuals will also need different contribution rates to have a three-quarters 
chance of reaching their target replacement income (Chart 15). 
 
Chart 1553 
 
 
If the single-tier state pension is uprated by the triple lock, a median earner 
needs a total contribution rate of 13% of band earnings to have a three-
quarters chance of reaching their target replacement income, under the 
baseline scenario of starting to save at age 22 and retiring at SPA. If the 
median earner takes a career break the contribution rate necessary to have a 
three-quarters chance of reaching the target replacement income increases to 
16%, and to 26% if the median earner starts saving at age 40. By contrast, if the 
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median earner starts to save at age 22 but retires two years after their SPA, 
they will need a total contribution rate of 11% to have a two-thirds chance of 
reaching their target replacement income, compared to 13% under the baseline 
scenario. 
 
If the single-tier state pension is uprated by changes in average earnings, a 
median earner will need higher levels of contributions to have a three-quarters 
chance of reaching their target replacement income. Under the baseline 
scenario of starting saving at age 22 and retiring at SPA, the contribution rate 
needed will be 17%, compared to 13% if the triple lock is used to uprate the 
single-tier pension. If the median earner takes career breaks they will need a 
total contribution rate of 21% and of 30% if the median earner starts saving at 
age 40 and retires at SPA. By contrast, if the median earner starts saving at age 
22 and retires two years after their SPA, they will need a total contribution rate 
of 14% of band earnings, compared to 17% under the baseline scenario. 
 
Summary 
This chapter has found that the contribution rate needed to have a good 
chance of achieving the target replacement income will depend on different 
factors such as individuals’ earnings levels, the investment approach followed 
and the level of charges paid, the indexation mechanism used to uprate the 
single-tier pension and changes in contribution patterns. 
· Lower earners need lower contribution rates than median and higher 
earners to have a good chance of reaching their target replacement 
income. But this depends on the indexation mechanism used for the 
single-tier state pension. 
· If the single-tier state pension is uprated by the triple lock, a lower 
earner will need a total contribution rate of 11% of band earnings to 
have a three-quarters chance of achieving their target replacement 
income. By contrast, a median earner will need to contribute 13% of 
band earnings and a higher earner will need to contribute 14%. This 
compares to 15% for a lower earner and 17% for median and higher 
earners if the single-tier state pension is uprated by changes in 
average earnings only. 
· Different investment approaches and the charges associated with 
them will affect the total contribution rate needed to have a good 
chance of achieving the target replacement income with the income 
from private and state pensions. But this will also depend on the 
indexation mechanism used for the single-tier state pension. 
· Changes in contribution patterns affect the contribution rate needed to 
have a good chance of reaching the target replacement income. For 
example, if the single-tier pension is triple locked, a median earner 
that takes career breaks needs a total contribution rate of 14% to have 
a two-thirds chance of reaching their target replacement income, 
compared to 11% under the baseline without career breaks. However 
the contribution rate necessary to have a two-thirds chance increases 
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to 18% if the single-tier state pension is uprated by average earnings, 
compared to 14% under the baseline.  
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Chapter 4: Is there an adequacy gap? 
 
The previous two chapters analysed retirement incomes from private pensions 
and the adequacy of total retirement income from private and state pensions. 
The chapters also analysed the contribution rate needed to have a good chance 
of achieving the target replacement income with the income from private and 
state pensions. This chapter elaborates on the findings of the previous two 
chapters by comparing the findings with current contribution rates. 
 
Current contribution rates are low 
The analysis in this report has shown that the contribution rate could have a 
significant impact on the adequacy of future pensioners’ retirement income. 
Analysis has also shown that total contribution rates would have to be above 
8% of band earnings to have a good chance of achieving different individuals’ 
target replacement rate. Contribution rates to UK occupational DC schemes 
have increased in recent years, mainly due to an increase in employers’ 
contributions. However they are still relatively low (Chart 16). 
 
Chart 1654 
 
 
In 2011, total average employer and employee contribution rates in private 
sector DC occupational schemes were around 9% of salary, this compares to 
around 7% in 2000. A total contribution rate of 9% of salary, which is 
equivalent to 12% of band earnings for a median earner with annual earnings 
of £23,000, may not be enough to reach a good chance of achieving the target 
replacement rate. This is especially the case for median and higher earners. 
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The introduction of automatic enrolment could affect the average contribution 
rate. This is because automatically enrolling all qualifying employees will 
represent a higher cost for employers in terms of contributions and 
administrative costs. Some employers could still decide to keep or even 
increase current contribution rate levels. However, some employers offering a 
pension for the first time could decide to offer the minimum contribution rate 
and some employers with an existing pension scheme offer the legal 
minimum contribution rate to new automatically-enrolled members.55 
 
There are a number of ways in which the Government could help 
individuals to achieve an adequate retirement income 
The Government could consider a number of strategies to increase pension 
saving:  
· The Government could encourage or enable the provision of 
information and advice to individuals. Individuals that have access to 
advice are more likely to know how much they need to save and when 
they can expect to retire.56 Given that individuals are likely to be 
automatically enrolled in a DC pension where the final pension 
outcome will depend on a number of factors such as the investment 
strategy and the charges paid, individuals could maximise their 
savings by choosing the type of pension products more convenient for 
them. Professional advice may play an important role in providing 
individuals information about what pension products are more 
adequate for their needs. 
· The Government could provide better incentives for pension saving, so 
that individuals choose to save more. However, recent PPI research 
has shown that incentives to save such as pension tax relief is poorly 
understood and that the majority of tax relief goes to higher rate tax 
payers.57 
 
Automatic enrolment was introduced because the system of incentives to save 
and advice has not worked well in the past. Therefore the Government could 
also consider a number of other alternative strategies to maximise individuals’ 
chances of having an adequate retirement income: 
· Initiatives based on inertia could impact on individuals’ saving 
decisions. For example, increasing minimum contribution levels or 
implementing initiatives such as “save more tomorrow” and “auto-
escalation,” which commit individuals to increase contribution levels 
as their salary increases.58 
· However, higher minimum contribution rates could lead to large 
numbers of people opting-out of pension saving, contradicting the goal 
of the automatic enrolment policy. Therefore, some form of 
compulsion by making saving into a workplace pension mandatory 
 
55 Johnson et al (2010)  
56 Unbiased.co.uk (2012) 
57 PPI (2013) 
58 Thaler and Bernartzi (2004) 
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might need to be considered if large numbers of people opt-out as a 
result of higher minimum contributions. 
· Promote initiatives that encourage individuals to use other types of 
wealth (e.g. housing equity) to increase their retirement savings.  
· Promote initiatives for individuals to work longer. The Government 
has already taken some measures in this respect such as the 
elimination of the Default Retirement Age (DRA) and the legislated 
and planned increases in the State Pension Age (SPA). 
 
Summary 
This chapter has found that: 
· Contribution rates to workplace pension schemes are generally too low 
to provide an adequate retirement income. This is particularly 
important for median and higher earners. 
· Upon the introduction of automatic enrolment, some employers could 
decide to maintain or increase contribution rates. But some others 
could also lower contribution rates to the legal minimum. 
· There are a number of strategies that the Government could consider 
to make individuals save more. For example, the Government could 
encourage or enable the provision of information and advice to 
individuals, or they could provide better incentives for pension saving, 
so that individuals choose to save more. 
· The Government could also consider a number of inertia mechanisms 
to increase contribution levels such as auto-escalation where a member 
contribution rate increases in line with earnings. However, some form 
of compulsion by making saving into a pension mandatory might need 
to be considered if individuals opted-out in large numbers as a result 
of higher minimum contributions. The Government could also 
promote initiatives that encourage people to use other types of wealth 
to increase their retirement savings and promote initiatives to make 
individuals work longer. 
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Annex 1: Technical Annex 
 
Introduction 
The case studies presented in this report were produced by the PPI using a 
model developed by the PPI in collaboration with Dr John Armstrong and 
Professor Teemu Pennanen of King’s College London. This annex describes the 
method and assumptions used in producing the analysis and a brief discussion 
of its limitations.   
 
The individuals used in this report are hypothetical and have highly stylised 
characteristics. The results are highly dependent upon the assumptions made 
and as such, should not be used in the provision of financial advice. 
 
Method 
The results presented in the report were achieved by combining pre-
determined individual work and saving patterns and investment approaches 
with 100,000 randomly generated economic scenarios. 
 
For each economic scenario, an individual’s target replacement income was 
calculated using the target replacement rates set out by the Pensions 
Commission in 2004 (see chapter 1).  Pre-retirement income was taken to be the 
average of the individual’s last 10 years of earnings, adjusted to be expressed 
in constant earnings terms. 
 
The individual’s post-retirement income was then calculated as the sum of 
their state and private pension entitlements. No allowance was made for any 
other benefits that the individual may be entitled to. For ease of comparison, 
retirement incomes in each year of the individual’s retirement have been 
expressed as a proportion of their target replacement income.  
 
The retirement incomes from each economic scenario were considered together 
in order to illustrate the full range of potential outcomes. Note that in the 
presentation of the results, no allowance has been made for individual 
mortality i.e. the probability that an individual’s income is greater than their 
target replacement income is actually the probability that the target is satisfied, 
given that the individual is still alive at that point. 
 
State pension 
Each of the individuals was assumed to be entitled to the full single-tier state 
pension once they reach state pension age, taken to be £144 per week in 2012. 
This was then uprated in future years in line with either average earnings 
growth, or the triple lock index; i.e. the greater of average earnings growth, 
CPI inflation or 2.5%. The results in this report are presented using both types 
of indexation. 
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Private pension 
At retirement the individual’s private pension entitlement is calculated by 
assuming that they use 75% of their total pension saving to purchase a single-
life level annuity. The remaining 25% is assumed to be taken as a tax-free lump 
sum and not included in the income adequacy calculation. 
 
The single-life level annuity factor is calculated using PMA92 life tables 
combined with the Continuous Mortality Investigation’s medium cohort 
projection of mortality improvement. The discount rate is the long-term gilt 
yield at the time of retirement, modelled as a random variable in each scenario. 
In addition to this, a 4% expense charge is assumed at the point of 
annuitisation. 
 
Individual characteristics 
Unless otherwise stated, all individuals are assumed to start work in 2018 at 
age 22, working each year of their life until retirement at their state pension age 
(SPA) of 68 in 2058.  
 
All individuals are assumed to be auto-enrolled in 2018 when contributions 
have been fully phased in. The contribution rates given in this report are 
employer and employee contributions combined, expressed as a percentage of 
band earnings.  
 
A number of different individual characteristics have been considered in this 
report in order to illustrate their potential impact on individual outcomes. 
 
Earnings level 
Individuals are described in this report as ‘low’, ‘median’ or ‘high’ earners. 
These individuals are considered to earn at the 30th, 50th and 70th percentiles of 
economy-wide age-specific earnings levels in each year that they are in work. 
 
Career break   
Career breaks are considered to take place between ages 32 and 39 before 
returning to work part-time (50% of full-time earnings) for two years until age 
41, when they recommence full-time work. 
 
Start saving at age 40 
In this scenario, the individual is auto-enrolled at age 40 in 2018 and has no 
prior pension saving. This individual reaches their SPA of 67 in 2039.   
 
Investment approach 
Three alternative investment approaches have been considered in this report: 
· Traditional lifestyle approach: Assets are 100% invested in equities 
until the individual is 10 years from retirement. At this point the 
individual’s fund undergoes a gradual transition until it reaches 75% 
gilts and 25% cash in the year of retirement. 
· First alternative approach: This approach aims to reduce fund volatility 
in early years by investing 2/3rd of the fund in gilts and 1/3rd in 
 49 
 
PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE  
equities. Over a period of 25 years this transitions to a fund of 1/6th 
gilts and 5/6th equity. For the final 10 years before retirement the fund 
transitions gradually into 75% gilts and 25% cash as in the traditional 
lifestyle approach. 
· Second alternative approach: This approach aims to reflect reduced 
fund volatility achieved through, for example, greater diversification 
and/or active fund management. Since the precise investment 
strategies of funds that follow this approach (e.g. ‘diversified growth 
funds’) are not known, we must rely on market research.59 We therefore 
model them by, using the same asset allocation as under the traditional 
lifestyle approach, but with the volatility of equity returns reduced by 
1/3rd. In order to reflect the reduced volatility, the transition period into 
75% gilts and 25% cash has been reduced from 10 to 5 years. 
 
Charges 
Provider annual management charges of 0.5% and 1.0% have been considered 
in this report. In addition to this, a charge has been applied to each asset class 
in order to reflect typical fund manager total expense ratios taken from LCP 
(2013). 
 
Limitations of analysis 
Care should be taken when interpreting the results in this report. In particular, 
one of the main limitations is that individuals are not considered to change 
their behaviour in response to investment performance. For example, if 
investments are performing poorly, an individual may choose to increase their 
contribution rate and vice versa. It is a result of this that such a wide dispersion 
of potential outcomes is observed. 
 
Monte Carlo simulation can be a powerful tool when trying to gain an 
understanding of the distribution of possible future outcomes. However, in 
common with other projection techniques, it is highly dependent on the 
assumptions made about the future. In this case, the choice of distribution and 
parameters of the underlying variables, the investment returns of equities, gilts 
and cash are important to the results.  
 
Economic scenarios 
This section provides a description of the model used to generate the economic 
scenarios for this project. 
 
The model is based upon a combination of PPI economic assumptions and 
analysis of historical data. Table A1 summarises: the risk factors that were 
modelled; the sources of historical data used and; the PPI’s long-term economic 
assumptions. 
 
 
 
 
59 Spence Johnson (2013) 
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Table A1: Model risk factors 
 
Abbreviation Description 
Source of historical data 
Long term assumptions 
G Nominal GDP. 
ONS quarterly data from 30/06/1955 to present.60 
Annual GDP growth of 4.0% 
P CPI. 
ONS monthly data from 29/02/1988 to present.61 
Data from 31/01/1950 to 31/01/1989 derived from ONS RPI 
data using the methodology described by O’Neill and Ralph62. 
Annual CPI growth of 2.0% 
W Average Weekly Earnings 
ONS monthly data from 31/01/2000 to present.63 
Rescaled valued from ONS Average Earnings Index from 
31/01/1963 to 31/12/199964. 
Annual average earnings growth of 4.4% 
Yl Long term yields. 
End of month FTSE Actuaries 15 Year Gilts Index from 
30/11/1998 to present.65 Low coupon 15 year gilts yields from 
31/12/1975 to 31/10/1998.66  
Nominal return on gilts of 4% 
Ys Money market yields. 
End of month 3 Month BBA Libor from 30/1/1987 to present.67 
Nominal return on gilts of 4% 
S Stock returns. 
End of month FTSE All share total return index from 
31/12/1985 to present.68 
Nominal return on equities of 7% 
 
Using these variables, a six dimensional process,    is defined. 
 
 
60 Source Bloomberg L.P 
61 Source Bloomberg L.P 
62 Robert O’Neill and Jeff  Ralph, Office for National Statistics (2013) 
63 Source Bloomberg L.P 
64 Source Bloomberg L.P 
65 Source Bloomberg L.P 
66 Data from the Heriot-Watt/Institute and Faculty of Actuaries Gilt Database 
67 Source Bloomberg L.P 
68 Source Bloomberg L.P 
 51 
 
PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE  
  =
⎣⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎡ ln  − ln     ln(  − ln     + 0.02)ln  − ln     ln      − 1 ln     − 1 ln   ⎦⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎤
 
 
Where t denotes time in months. 
 
The development of the vector    is modelled by the first order stochastic 
difference equation: 
 ∆  =      +  +    
 
Where   is a 6 by 6 matrix,   is a six dimensional vector and    are independent 
multivariate Gaussian random variables with zero mean. The values of   and   
and the volatilities and correlation of the    are given in table A2. The matrix   
and the covariance matrix of the    were determined by calibrating against the 
historical data. The coefficients of   were then selected to match the long term 
economic assumptions. 
 
It follows that the values of    will have a multivariate normal distribution. 
Simulated investment returns will, however, be non-Gaussian partly because 
of the nonlinear transformations above. Moreover, the yields are nonlinearly 
related to bond investments. 
 
The first component and third components of    give the annual growth rates 
of GDP and wages, respectively. The fourth and fifth components are 
transformed yields. The transformation applied ensures that the yields are 
always positive in simulations. Similarly the second component gives a 
transformed growth rate of CPI. In this case, the transformation applied 
ensures that inflation never drops below -2% in the simulations. This figure 
was selected to be twice the maximum rate of deflation ever found in the 
historical data. More sophisticated transformations of the CPI that allow for 
arbitrarily negative deflation could be considered instead, but seem 
unnecessary for the purposes of this paper.  
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Table A2: Model parameters 
The matrix    G P W Yl Ys S 
G 0.0000 -0.0026 0.0000 0.0010 -0.0006 0.0000 
 P 0.0000 -0.0383 0.3936 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 W 0.1028 0.0000 -0.3759 -0.0010 0.0020 0.0000 
 Yl 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0055 0.0000 0.0000 
 Ys 6.4361 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0348 0.0000 
 S 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
The vector  ′  G P W Yl Ys S  -0.0101 -0.1406 0.0085 0.0220 -0.1190 0.0058 
Annual volatility 
of     G P W Yl Ys S  0.41 0.09 1.20 1.34 1.25 0.73 
Correlation 
matrix of     G P W Yl Ys S G 1.00 -0.01 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.13 
 P -0.01 1.00 0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.04 
 W 0.11 0.02 1.00 0.15 0.07 -0.02 
 Yl 0.07 0.06 0.15 1.00 0.30 -0.12 
 Ys 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.30 1.00 -0.12 
 S 0.13 -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 -0.12 1.00 
 
Monthly log-returns on bond and money market investments are given by 
    =   /12−   ∆      =  ,   
 
Where D is the duration of the investment class,   = 12.25 and   = 0.125. 
 
For a general reference on multivariate time series analysis see Lütkepohl69. 
Other applications of the modelling approach presented here can be found, for 
example, in Koivu, Pennanen and Ranne70 and Aro and Pennanen (2005)71. 
 
Modelling of the triple lock 
An important result from the report is the impact that state pension uprating 
policy could potentially have on retirement income adequacy. 
 
This report considers two scenarios for state pension uprating: 
· The state pension continues to be uprated in line with the triple lock 
i.e. the greater of CPI, average earnings growth or 2.5%. 
· The state pension is uprated in line with average earnings growth only. 
 
The triple lock index is calculated in each year of each economic scenario using 
the simulated values of CPI and average earnings growth produced by the 
 
69 Lütkepohl (2006) 
70M.Koivu, T.Pennanen and A.Rann (2005)  
71 H.Aro and T.Pennanen (forthcoming) 
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model. Table A3 summarises the projected triple lock index and state pension 
levels. 
 
Table A3: Summary of triple lock and state pension outcomes  
Triple lock 
Mean triple lock growth 4.8% 
Mean triple lock excess over earnings 0.4% 
Annual state pension level (£p.a) expressed in 2012 earnings terms 
Year Mean 5th percentile Median 95th 
percentile 
2012 (year 1) £7,488  - - - 
2022 (year 10) £7,800 £7,500 £7,700 £8,500 
2032 (year 20) £8,300 £7,500 £8,100 £9,700 
2042 (year 30) £8,700 £7,600 £8,400 £10,600 
2052 (year 40) £9,125 £7,700 £8,800 £11,700 
2062 (year 50) £9,600 £7,800 £9,200 £12,900 
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